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Whither State Immunity?: An Assessment of the
Current State of the Law
Gamal Moursi Badr*
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to examine some important
developments which, in recent years, have dotted the long and
tortuous path of the doctrine of state immunity' and have af-
fected it in such a way that their continued influence on the
future evolution of the doctrine in international law can hardly
be doubted. The developments in question are the European
Convention on State Immunity and Additional Protocol of 1972
(Convention),2 the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 (U.S. Act),3 the British State Immunity Act of 1978
(U.K. Act),' and the Singapore State Immunity Act of 1979
(Singapore Act).' This article examines the provisions of these in-
struments to discern patterns and differences among the four,
and also to point out the direction that the provisions individually
* Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations Secretariat; Former Member of
the Board, National Bar Association, Cairo; former Justice of the Supreme
Court, Algiers. LL.D., Alexandria University, 1954. The views expressed in this
paper are the writer's own and should not be attributed to the United Nations.
1. The doctrine of state immunity holds that a foreign state is exempt
from the exclusive and absolute jurisdiction of the forum state by reason of the
implied consent of the forum state. The doctrine is said to have arisen from
standards of public morality, fair-dealing, reciprocal self-interest, and respect
for the power and dignity of the foriegn sovereign, National City Bank v.
Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 362 (1955), as well as from principles of interna-
tional comity due from one sovereign to another, The Carlo Poma, 259 F. 369,
370 (2d Cir. 1919), vacated on other grounds, 255 U.S. 219 (1921).
2. The European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, reprinted
in Explanatory Reports on the European Convention on State Immunity and
the Additional Protocol, submitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe, 49-72 (Strasbourg 1972) [hereinafter cited as Convention Explanatory
Report].
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
4. State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33.
5. State Immunity Act, 1979, ch. 19 (Singapore).
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and collectively may be said to have imposed on the future
development of the doctrine of state immunity.'
In any survey of state practice and national legislation regard-
ing state immunity, a mere numerical majority of doctrinal ap-
proach would be a misleading indication of the current state of
the law. More weight should be given to the practice of states
that have a larger volume of external trade and a more exten-
sive involvement in transnational intercourse of all kinds. Those
states reach out more often and more intensively into the
juridical domains of other states and give rise to more frequent
claims by foreigners against them or by their nationals against
foreign states. For such states the question of jurisdictional im-
munity is of more importance and their practice with regard to it
is a more significant indicator of the status of international law
on the subject. Hence, this article recognizes the particular im-
portance of the Convention elaborated by the twenty-one
member states of the Council of Europe and the legislation
recently enacted by the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Singapore.
II. IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
There is no need to deal descriptively here with the European
Convention, the U.S.Act, or the U.K. Act. Such an endeavor has
already been undertaken for each of those instruments in-
dividually and the results and the explanatory reports of the
legislation are readily available.7 The Singapore Act contains the
same provisions as the U.K. Act, after which it was modeled.
6. Received too late for inclusion in the text, the State Immunity Or-
dinance, 1981, of Pakistan, Ordinance No. VI of 1981, published in The Gazette
of Pakistan, March 11, 1981, is modeled after the U.K. Act from which its main
provisions are taken almost verbatim, except that the Pakistani Ordinance does
not contain a provision of nonimmunity with regard to the tort liability of
foreign states. With this one exception, all the commentary in the text on the
U.K. Act applies to the Pakistani Ordinance. It could well be that other coun-
tries, unknown to the present writer, are preparing legislation along the same
restrictive lines.
In September of 1981 a bill was pending before the Senate of Canada (Bill
5-19) entitled "An Act to provide for State Immunity in Canadian Courts." It
was expected to be voted into law. The provisions of the bill are similar to
those of the U.S. Act and the U.K. Act.
7. Adede, The United Kingdom Abandons the Doctrine of Absolute
Sovereign Immunity, 6 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 197 (1980); Adede, The Doctrine of
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The approach of this article will be to review the features com-
mon to the four instruments under consideration and the aspects
in which the instruments differ, assessing the current state of
the law of state immunity, as reflected therein.
The Convention and the three Acts have the following in com-
mon with regard to immunity from jurisdiction:
(1) They each adopt the restrictive approach to state immunity
and indicate, either by listing or in more general provisions, a
vast category of claims with regard to which a foreign state, out-
side any explicit waiver, is not entitled to immunity
(2) They each adopt the objective definition of the public acts
of a foreign state for which it is generally admitted there is im-
munity from jurisdiction.9 Intrinsically private acts no longer en-
joy immunity even if they are politically motivated and performed
for state reasons. The purchase of the proverbial boots for the
army is no longer protected with immunity from jurisdiction.
Sovereign Immunity Under Int'l Commercial Law, 17 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 245
(1977) (deals with the European Convention and the U.S. Act); Bird, The State
Immunity Act of 1978: An English Update, 13 INT'L LAW 619 (1979); Carl, Suing
Foreign Governments in American Courts: The United States Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act in Practice, 33 Sw. L. J. 1009 (1979); Del Bianco, Ex-
ecution and Attachment Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
5 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 109 (1978-79); Deluame, The State Immunity
Act of the United Kingdom, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 185 (1979); Kahale and Vega, Im-
munity and Jurisdiction: Toward a Uniform Body of Law in Actions Against
Foreign States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211 (1979); Leventhal, The Bay of
Campeche Oil Spil" Obtaining Jurisdiction over Petroleos Mexicanos under the
FSIA of 1976, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 341 (1980); Mann, The State Immunity Act 1978
50 BRIT. YEAR INT'L L. 43 (1981); Marston, State Immunity-Recent United
Kingdom Developments, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 349 (1979); Sinclair, The Euro-
pean Convention on State Immunity, 22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 254 (1973); Von
Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1978); Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976: Its Origin, Meaning and Effect, 3 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1
(1976-77).
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976); State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 1(1);
State Immunity Act, 1979, ch. 19, § 3(1) (Singapore); European Convention on
State Immunity, art. 15 (1972), reprinted in Convention Explanatory Report,
supra note 2, at 50 [hereinafter cited as Convention]. See also infra note 39.
9. The U.S. Act expressly states that the "character of an activity shall
be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)
(1976). The Convention, the U.K. Act, and the Singapore Act, although contain-
ing no such express statement, are arranged as a series of exceptions to the
rule of immunity, the exceptions themselves being directed to the nature of the
transaction giving rise to the claim rather than the purpose for the particular
state's act. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, the four instruments differ in their treat-
ment of immunity from execution. The Convention's approach is
not followed, with minor exceptions, by the U.S. Act or the U.K.
Act.
The degree to which the four instruments have followed the
restrictive doctrine can best be brought to light by a com-
parative analysis of their provisions with reference to four
sources of rights and obligations that result in claims before the
local courts against foreign states. In private law two primary
sources of personal rights and obligations are contract and tort.
In addition, ownership of immovable property, regardless of the
mode of acquisition, entails certain rights and obligations which
can give rise to disputes. Finally, the law itself may be a direct
source of rights and obligations, such as in matters of taxation
and patents. All four sources of rights and obligations are ad-
dressed by each of the four instruments under consideration.
The extent to which a foreign state is considered immune with
respect to contracts concluded by it, torts attributable to it,
ownership rights, and rights and obligations deriving directly
from the law is a sure indication of the measure of immunity it
still enjoys. Conversely, a lack of immunity with regard to the
four sources of rights and obligations indicates by its extent how
far the four instruments have gone on the way of restricting im-
munity; substantial lack of immunity in these four areas is in-
dicative of an equally substantial abandonment of the principle of
immunity itself.
A. Contracts
Contracts, as a generic source of obligations, heads the Con-
vention's catalog of matters with regard to which there is no im-
munity. Immunity is denied "if the proceedings relate to an
obligation of the State, which by virtue of a contract falls to be
discharged in the territory of the State of the forum."1 The Ex-
planatory Report emphasizes that "[iun principle, immunity
should not be granted to a State with respect to any contracts it
has concluded.""
The U.S. Act does not mention contracts as a source of obliga-
10. Convention, supra note 8, art. 4, para. 1.
11. Convention Explanatory Report, supra note 2, para. 26, at 14.
Q
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tions with regard to which there is no immunity, but the lack of
express reference is a matter of drafting technique rather than
substance. The regime of the Act centers around the concept of
"commercial activity."'" The foreign state is not immune to suits
arising from commercial activity. 3 "Commercial" simply means
private or nonpublic. The Act defines "commercial activity" as
being "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a par-
ticular commercial transaction or act."'" The report which accom-
panied the bill submitted to the House of Representatives 5 ex-
plains that the term "a particular commercial transaction or act"
encompasses "a single contract, if of the same character as a con-
tract which might be made by a private person."'" Thus, through
its particular definition of "commercial activity," the U.S. Act
provides no immunity for foreign states with regard to any con-
tractual obligation of private law. There is no difference, in this
respect, between the U.S. Act and the European Convention.
The U.K. Act also excludes from immunity contractual obliga-
tions of foreign states. 7 It provides that a state is not immune as
respects proceedings relating to "an obligation of the State
which by virtue of a contract (whether a commercial transaction
or not) falls to be performed wholly or partly in the United
Kingdom."'8 The same type of provision is found in the Singapore
Act. 9 Thus, all four instruments deny foreign states immunity
with regard to the main source of private law obligations - con-
tract.
While dealing with contract as a generic source of obligations,
the four instruments mention, in their texts or in expanatory
reports, certain specific contracts or contractual relationships,
reiterating with regard to them the nonimmunity rule. The Con-
12. Lawyers trained in the civil law tradition should be alerted that the
word "commercial" here is used in a less technical and much wider sense than
the one with which they are familiar in the civil-commercial distinction that
determines whether the civil code or the code of commerce will apply, or
whether the civil or commercial courts will be competent.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
15. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.].
16. H.R. REP., supra note 15, at 16.
17. State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, §§ 3,4.
18. Id. § (1)(b).
19. State Immunity Act, 1979, ch. 19, § 5(1) (Singapore).
19821
Duquesne Law Review
vention includes specific reference to the contract of
employment" and to participation in a company, an association,
or other entity having its seat, registered office, or principal
place of business in the state of the forum.21 The report accompa-
nying the U.S. Act mentions "a foreign government's sale of a
service or a product, its leasing of property, its borrowing of
money, its employment or engagement of laborers, clerical staff
or public relations or marketing agents, or its investment in a
security of an American corporation" as examples of contracts in
respect of which there is no immunity." The U.K. Act and the
Singapore Act mention any contract for the supply of goods or
services, any loan or other transaction for the provision of
finance and any guarantee relating to such a loan or any other
financial obligation.23 Contracts of employment 4 and membership
in bodies corporate, unincorporated bodies, or partnerships are
also referenced.25
With regard to contracts of employment, the Convention, the
U.K. Act, and the Singapore Act set forth certain conditions for
the denial of immunity. These conditions do not, however, con-
stitute a restriction on the nonimmunity rule; they but rather ap-
pear to be intended to ensure sufficient jurisdictional ties be-
tween the case and the forum. Thus, the Convention, 6 the U.S.
Act,27 and the Singapore Act28 require for the denial of immunity
that the individual not be a national of the foreign state and that
he be either a national or a resident of the state of the forum. In
the absence of the connection represented by nationality or
residence, the courts of the employing state are considered a
more appropriate forum before which to press a claim. It ap-
pears, therefore, that the approach is one of requiring the
presence of certain relationships and in their absence denying
20. Convention, supra note 8, art. 5.
21. Id. art. 6.
22. H.R. REP., supra note 15, at 16.
23. State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 3(3); State Immunity Act, 1979, ch.
19, § 5(3) (Singapore).
24. State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 4; State Immunity Act, 1979, ch. 19,
§ 6 (Singapore).
25. State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 3; State Immunity Act, 1979, ch. 19,
§ 10 (Singapore).
26. Convention, supra note 8, art. 5.
27. State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 4.
28. State Immunity Act, 1979, ch. 19, § 6 (Singapore).
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jurisdiction to the local courts, rather than one of granting im-
munity to the foreign state.' The nonimmunity rule with regard
to other contractual obligations of the foreign state appears to be
unaffected by the special treatment of employment contracts in
the Convention, the U.K. Act, and the Singapore Act.
B. Torts
Tort, the second source of obligations in private law, is treated
in Article 11 of the Convention, which denies immunity to the
foreign state in respect of "redress for injury to the person or
damage to tangible property" provided there is a territorial link
between the damaging act and the state of the forum. The word-
ing of this provision indicates that the lack of immunity relates
only to claims of compensation for physical injury to person or
* property and for nonphysical injury accompanying the physical
injury. 0 In the absence of physical injury to the person or
damage to tangible property, the rule of nonimmunity does not
apply. 3 1
The U.S. Act has similar provisions.2 Generally, there is no
immunity with regard to proceedings in which money damages
are sought for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of
property. 3' The U.S. Act explicitly excludes from the rule of
nonimmunity claims based on the exercise by the foreign state of
a discretionary function34 and claims arising out of malicious
29. See Convention, supra note 8, art 5, para. 2(c) (limitation of the non-
immunity rule as to employment contracts is a function of the forum state's
subject-matter jurisdiction in the case); Convention Explanatory Report, supra
note 2, para. 30, at 15 (where the nonimmunity rule is inapplicable, "the links
between the employee and the employing State (in whose courts the employee
may always bring proceedings), are generally closer than those between the
employee and the State of the forum").
30. See Convention Explanatory Report, supra note 2, para. 48, at 20.
31. Id.
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1976).
33. Id.
34. Id. § 1605(a)(5)(B). The House Report, H.R. REP., supra note 15, at 21,
explains that these exceptions correspond to many of the claims with respect to
which the United States Government retains immunity, in national suits, under
the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1966). This is an
assimilation of the foreign state's position to that of the domestic state. The
U.S. Act also treats the foreign state on a par with the United States Govern-
ment regarding several procedural matters. See Von Mehren, supra note 7, at
45-46. It is thus permissible to question the unqualified statement by one of the
19821
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prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights. 5 The U.K. Act and
the Singapore Act also provide that a State is not immune in
respect to proceedings relating to death or personal injury or
damage or loss of tangible property." Nonphysical injury not
connected to a physical injury" is not covered by the rule of
nonimmunity.
The Convention and the three Acts expressly affirm the prin-
ciple of state immunity as a basic, all-embracing rule to which
the listed cases of nonimmunity are mere exceptions. 8 However,
none of the four instruments, their explanatory reports, or their
doctrinal commentaries, contain an example of a case where im-
munity can properly and successfully be invoked. On the con-
trary, the rather extensive catalogs of matters where the im-
munity rule does not apply make it difficult to imagine an instance
where the local courts have subject-matter jurisdiction but are
barred from exercising it by virtue of the defendant foreign
state's immunity."
drafters of the U.S. Act to the effect that the Act "does not base itself on Pro-
fessor Lauterpacht's assimilative approach." Leigh, 1978 Proceedings of the In-
ternational Law Association Conference on State Immunity 18.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1601(a)(5)(B).
36. State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 5; State Immunity Act, 1979, ch. 19,
§ 7 (Singapore).
37. The significance of the exclusion from the rule of nonimmunity of
claims based solely on nonphysical injury, an exclusion common to all four in-
struments, is discussed in the textual paragraphs that follow. See infra text ac-
companying notes 40-64.
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976); State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 1(1);
State Immunity Act, 1979, ch. 19, § 3(1) (Singapore); Convention, supra note 8,
art. 15. Some writers view as significant the fact that the Convention starts
with the enumeration of cases where immunity cannot be claimed and only later
affirms the basic rule of immunity, while the U.S. Act and the U.K. Act reverse
this order by first affirming state immunity and then listing the exceptional
cases of nonimmunity. They therefore describe the principle of immunity in the
Convention as purely "residual." See Delaume, supra note 7, at 186; Sinclair,
supra note 7, at 267. Immunity is described as "residual" also in the case of
U.K. Act. See Mann, supra note 7, at 62. It does not appear that the formal se-
quence of basic rule and exceptions is of any substantive importance. All four
instruments consider immunity to be the rule outside the specific areas of
nonimmunity listed by each of them.
39. In making this observation, one should bear in mind that: (1) Public acts
of the foreign state lack jurisdictional contact with the country of the forum
and therefore lie squarely beyond the jurisdiction of its courts and raise no proper
issue of immunity, see Von Mehren, supra note 7, at 50-51; and (2) The objective
definition of public acts adopted by all four instruments makes it impossible to in-
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A question thus arises: In what type of dispute would both
jurisdiction for the local court be appropriate and immunity for
the foreign state be applicable? Is the area of tort liability for
purely nonphysical injury an example of this elusive type of
dispute with regard to which the defense of state immunity is
still available? Although it appears at first glance that such is
the case, a closer examination indicates that under the Conven-
tion the scope of immunity is negligible in even this limited area
and that with regard to the three Acts the immunity is nonexist-
ent.
Regarding the U.S. Act, the exclusions from the rule of nonim-
munity,10 as the wording of section 1605(a)(5) and the House
Report made perfectly clear, apply only to noncommercial torts.'
The Act uses the term "commercial" to mean private."2 Hence,
noncommercial torts are those torts committed by the state in
the discharge of its governmental and administrative functions.
The exclusions from the rule of nonimmunity do not, therefore,
apply to torts committed by the state in the course of its com-
mercial activity. Commercial torts are included in the generality
of the rule of nonimmunity, regardless of whether the injury is
physical or purely nonphysical. 3 Thus, for example, unfair com-
petition and defamation, assuming such torts can accompany the
trading activities of a foreign state, can be brought before U.S.
courts as grounds for liability with no possibility of the defen-
dant foreign state successfully invoking immunity.
The scope of nonimmunity under the U.S. Act thus appears to
be somewhat broader than the scope of nonimmunity under the
Convention or the U.K. Act. This difference arises from the use
of the concept of commercial activity as a starting point. The
Convention and the U.K. Act mention contracts in general and
then list specific contracts or contractual situations among which
there is no place for torts. By avoiding any mention of contract
and by relating nonimmunity to "a commercial activity" or "an
act performed . . . in connection with a commercial activity,""
voke immunity in a dispute relating to a private act which the foreign state would
choose to characterize as public with reference to its purpose, see supra note 8.
40. See supra text accompanying notes 34 & 35.
41. See H.R. REP., supra note 15, at 20-21.
42. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
44. Id.
1982]
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the U.S. Act makes room for both contract and tort and,
moreover, does not require a physical injury subsequent to the
commercial tort in order to deny immunity with regard to it.
Returning to noncommercial torts under the U.S. Act, one is
reminded that the only governmental functions of foreign states
in the territory of the state of the forum are those related to
diplomatic representation and consular activities. This is a
separate area which has its own rules of immunity" and with
which this article is not concerned. In fact, it was precisely for
the purpose of countering the effects of those immunities with
regard to traffic accidents that section 1605(a)(5) of the U.S. Act
was first conceived with a view to providing for the victims of
those accidents and their heirs some form of redress.4" Despite
primary concern over auto traffic torts, the provision is cast in
general terms and applies to all tort actions for money damages,
regardless of their cause.
In De Letelier v. Republic of Chile,7 the defendant foreign
state, while denying any involvement in the assassination of
Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffit,"8 argued that the nonimmunity
provision of section 1605(a)(5) did not apply to political tortious
acts of a foreign government because of their public, governmen-
tal character. Citing the clear language of the U.S. Act and its
legislative history, the federal district court rejected this argu-
ment and denied immunity to the defendant. 9 The court further
ruled that none of the exceptions to the rule of nonimmunity 5 apply
to a foreign state's involvement in a political assassination com-
mitted in the United States.5
The exceptions to the rule of nonimmunity found in the U.S.
Act are derived from the Federal Tort Claims Act.5 ' The United
States government, engaged in day-to-day functions as
depositary of public authority and enforcer of laws and regula-
45. See The Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Relations; The Vienna
Convention of 1963 on Consular Relations.
46. See H.R. REP., supra note 15, at 20-21.
47. 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
48. Letelier and Moffit were, respectively, a former Chilean ambassador and
an American citizen who happened to be with him. Id.
49. Id. at 671-72.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A),(B) (1976).
51. 488 F. Supp. at 672-73.
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a),(h) (1976).
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tions, would be exposed to wanton claims for compensation of
nonphysical injury allegedly resulting from the discharge of its
governmental functions were it not for the protection provided
by the Federal Tort Claims Act. No such role devolves to foreign
states in the territory of the United States. They have no
governmental or administrative functions, outside of the
diplomatic and consular domain, the discharge of which might
give rise to claims for compensation for nonphysical injury. It is
not easy to visualize how a foreign state can exercise or fail to
exercise discretionary functions in the territory of the United
States and by so doing cause injury to private parties who would
then seek redress against the foreign state. 3 It is equally dif-
ficult to visualize the foreign state as accountable in the ter-
ritory of the United States for malicious prosecution or abuse of
process." It appears that the exceptions to the rule of nonim-
munity in section 1605(a)(5), copied from a national statute'
without regard for the fundamental difference between the role
of the domestic state and that of foreign states in the national
territory, are not real exceptions because they cannot in practice
apply to a foreign state.
From a different point of view, the exclusions from the rule of
nonimmunity in section 1605(a)(5) of the U.S. Act appear un-
necessary. According to universally applicable rules of private
international law, claims in tort are subject to the law of the
place where the injury or the conduct causing the injury occurred.5
For example, in a suit before a United States court against a
foreign state for damages based on any of the actions or omis-
sions mentioned in section 1605(a)(5)(A) and (B) and occurring in
the United States, the judge would apply the law of the United
States. This law provides that no case against the government
can be heard if its object is compensation for nonphysical injury
resulting from such actions or omission.5 ' Thus, the application of
the proper law of the relationship would lead inevitably to the
very result sought by precluding nonimmunity in exclusions
under section 1605(a)(5). Whenever the normal application of the
rules of private international law ensures the end served or
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (1976).
54. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B) (1976).
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 146 (1969).
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A),(B) (1976).
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thought to be served by state immunity, the latter concept need
not be invoked and indeed seems redundant.
At first glance, the European Convention, the U.K. Act, and
the Singapore Act do not seem to contain the above distinction
between commercial torts, included under the general terms of
the nonimmunity provision on commercial activity, and noncom-
mercial torts, to which alone the restrictive provision of section
1605(a)(5) of the U.S. Act applies. In the Convention and the two
Acts, torts, with no indication that only noncommercial torts are
meant, are dealt with in a single provision. 7 The three in-
struments preclude immunity only in respect of torts resulting in
death or injury to the person and damage or loss of tangible
property. Thus, torts resulting only in nonphysical injury are not
covered by the nonimmunity rule and a foreign state could
presumably claim immunity with regard to suits arising from
such torts.
But how real is this apparent area of reserved immunity under
the Convention and the U.K. and Singapore Acts? As stated
above,58 torts arising from public acts of the state and resulting
in nonphysical injury can occur only in the state's own territory.
Claims based on this kind of tort, made against a foreign state
before the courts of other states, are brought before the wrong
forum. As to torts connected with the foreign state's private ac-
tivities in the territory of the state of the forum, separate provis-
ions of the Convention and the two Acts ensure their submission
to the the jurisdiction of local courts despite their apparent ex-
clusion from the nonimmunity rule.
The Convention submits all the activities of an office, agency,
or other establishment of a foreign state in the territory of the
state of the forum to the jurisdiction of the courts of the latter. 9
There is no distinction made as to the nature of the activity, con-
tractual or otherwise, or the nature of the injury for which com-
pensation is sought, material or nonmaterial." Thus, a tort com-
mitted in connection with the activities of such an office can
57. See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 5; State Immunity Act, 1979, ch.
19, § 7 (Singapore); Convention, supra note 8, art. 11.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
59. Convention, supra note 8, art. 7.
60. Id.
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always be invoked in a suit before the local courts regardless of
the nonphysical nature of the injury and with no opportunity for
the foreign state to plead immunity. Only such torts attributed
to foreign states having no office, agency, or other establishment
in the state of the forum are subject to immunity under the pro-
visions of the Convention. There is obviously only a slight
possibility of such torts being committed by states having only
occasional trade activities with the state of the forum. The prac-
tical importance of this residual area of immunity in matters of
tort appears to be minimal and the chances of its being actually
applied remote.
Under the U.K. Act 1 and the Singapore Act, 2 the rule of
nonimmunity as to torts connected to the foreign state's private
activities extends to torts arising from a "commercial trans-
action," which is stated to be any "activity (whether of a com-
mercial, industrial, financial, professional or other similar
character) . . . in which [the state] engages . . ." This provision is
not made conditional on the existence within the forum of an of-
fice, agency, or other establishment of the foreign state. 3
Therefore, any private tort attributable to a foreign state and oc-
curring in the territories of the United Kingdom or Singapore
can be invoked before British or Singapore courts without a
defense of immunity being available to the defendant foreign
state. Torts connected with the discharge of the public functions
of the state, as explained above, are confined to the state's ter-
ritory and lie beyond the jurisdiction of the forum.
In summary, only the Convention retains an area of immunity
with regard to claims based on tort and that area covers only
torts attributable to a foreign state having no office, agency, or
other trade establishment in the state of the forum." As already
indicated, the practical incidence of claims of this nature against
foreign states whose trade volume does not call for the establish-
ment of a local office or agency can be said to be negligible.
61. State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 3(3)(c).
62. State Immunity Act, 1979, ch. 19, § 5(3)(c) (Singapore).
63. State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 3(3)(c); State Immunity Act, 1979, ch.
19, § 5(3)(c) (Singapore).
64. The Explanatory Report cites unfair competition and defamation as ex-
amples of such torts. Convention Explanatory Report, supra note 2, para. 48, at 20.
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C. Ownership and Possession
All four instruments are in agreement that with regard to
rights and obligations resulting from ownership or possession of
immovable property situated in the state of the forum, the
foreign state can claim no immunity from suit." On excepting
diplomatic and consular property from the rule of nonimmunity
and maintaining it under its own proper rules, all four in-
struments are also in agreement." Once a particular piece of
property is considered not to be diplomatic or consular, it does
not matter whether the property is used for commercial or for
public purposes. 7 Denial of immunity is based on the nature of
the property; that is, whether or not it is diplomatic or consular,
and not on the purposes it serves.
The Explanatory Report of the Convention cites examples of
proceedings covered by the nonimmunity rule in respect of
ownership or possession of immovable property:
1. proceedings against States concerning their rights in im-
movable property in the State of the forum;
2. proceedings relating to mortgages whether the foreign State
is mortgagor or mortgagee;
3. proceedings relating to nuisance;
4. proceedings arising from the unauthorized (permanent or
temporary) use of immovable property including actions in
trespass, whether an injunction is claimed or damages or both;
5. proceedings concerning rights to the use of immovable prop-
erty in the state of the forum; for example, actions to establish
the existence or non-existence of a lease or tenancy agreement, or
for possession or eviction;
6. proceedings relating to payments due from a State for the use
of immovable property, or of a part thereof, in the State of the
forum ... ;
7. proceedings relating to the liabilities of a: State as the owner
or occupier of immovable property in the State of the forum (for
example, accidents caused by the dilapidated state of the building,
actio de ejectis vel effusis) 8 •
It is clear that every imaginable dispute stemming from a
65. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4) (1976); State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 6(1)(a);
State Immunity Act, 1979, ch. 19, § 8 (Singapore); Convention, supra note 8, art. 9.
66. See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 16(a)(b); State Immunity Act, 1979,
ch. 19, § 19(1) (Singapore); Convention, supra note 8, art. 32.
67. H.R. REP., supra note 15, at 20. See also supra note 8.
68. Convention Explanatory Report, supra note 2, para. 44, at 19.
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foreign state's ownership or possession of an immovable prop-
erty in the state of the forum is covered by the nonimmunity
rule.
With regard to diplomatic or consular property, the Report ac-
companying the U.S. Act makes the following point:
It is maintainable that the exception . . . with respect to
diplomatic and consular property is limited to questions of attach-
ment and execution and does not apply to an adjudication of
rights in that property. Thus the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations concluded in 1961 .... provides in article 22
that the "premises of the mission, their furnishings and other
property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall
be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution."
Actions short of attachment or execution seem to be permitted
under the Convention, and a foreign state cannot deny to the local
state, the right to adjudicate questions of ownership, rent, servi-
tudes, and similar matters, as long as the foreign state's posses-
sion of the premises is not disturbed. 9
It therefore seems certain that nonimmunity from suit extends
to diplomatic and consular property with regard to which only
immunity from execution and other enforcement measures is
available to foreign states."
D. Obligations Derived Directly from the Law
The law can be a direct source of certain rights and obliga-
tions which are not founded on contract, tort, or the ownership
or possession of immovable property. Typical of this type of
rights and obligations are those connected with patents and
trademarks and those concerning taxation. The Convention in-
cludes in its catalog of cases on nonimmunity proceedings those
relating to patents, trademarks and the like. 1 The U.K. Act and
the Singapore Act extend the rule of nonimmunity to pro-
ceedings relating to patents, trademarks and the like"2 and -to
69. H.R. REP., supra note 13, at 20.
70. In its judgment of 30 October 1962, Bundesverfassungsgericht 1/60, the
Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany ruled that there is no
established rule of international law precluding the local courts from hearing a
claim against a foreign state relating to the ownership of the land on which its em-
bassy building stands.
71. See Convention, supra note 8, art. 8.
72. State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 7; State Immunity Act, 1979, ch. 19, § 9
(Singapore).
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certain forms of taxation, such as a value-added tax, customs or
excise duties, and rates in respect of premises used for commer-
cial purposes."
The U.S. Act does not explicitly mention proceedings relating
to this type of rights and obligations. They are covered,
however, by the very broad terms of section 1605(a)(2), which
deals with commercial activity. The report containing the sec-
tion-by-section analysis of the U.S. Act states: "The courts would
have a great deal of latitude in determining what is a commercial
activity for purposes of this bill. It has seemed unwise to at-
tempt an excessively precise definition of this term, even if that
were practicable.7  In the exercise of this wide latitude the
courts will most likely consider any claims in connection with a
patent, a trademark, or the like as relating to the foreign state's
commercial activity and will consequently deny immunity.
III. IMMUNITY FROM EXECUTION
The almost perfect symmetry observed in the provisions of the
Convention and the three Acts with regard to immunity from
suit is lacking in their provisions on immunity from execution.
Because all four instruments restrict immunity from suit (ap-
parently toan extent greater in fact than what is readily admitted)
they were forced to face the question of enforcement of
judgments rendered against foreign states. Considerations other
than those involved in determining the scope of immunity from
suit are taken into account in reaching a decision regarding im-
munity from execution." Consequently, the four instruments
treat the matter differently, the Convention adopting one ap-
proach and the three Acts, with slight variations among them,
another.
In the course of the elaboration of the European Convention,
the Austrian delegation submitted in May 1964 a report which
observed with regard to immunity from execution that:
[tlhe question of whether it is possible to proceed to measures of
execution against the property of foreign states is controversial.
73. State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 11; State Immunity Act, 1979, ch. 19, §
13 (Singapore).
74. H.R. REP., supra note 15, at 16.
75. See infra text accompanying note 76.
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In certain states, such execution is prohibited while in others it is
permitted, and in yet others it depends on authorization. In the
two latter cases, it cannot however take place against the prop-
erty of a foreign state which is used for public purposes and it is
sometimes difficult to distinguish such property from that which
is used for private purposes. The report therefore recommended
that execution should not be levied against the property of
foreign states, but that an attempt should be made to reach an in-
ternational agreement whereby states would comply voluntarily
with judgments given against them.
Precisely such a solution was eventually adopted by the Conven-
tion by creating an obligation for each contracting state in favor
of other contracting states to "give effect to a judgment given
against it" provided the said judgment is definitive and ex-
ecutory.77
The Convention thus transfers the obligation to give effect to
a judgment from the internal legal order of the state of the
forum to the international legal order. An international obliga-
tion is created, engaging the responsibility of the judgment debtor
state vis-a-vis the state of the nationality of the judgment
creditor. 8 Failure by the former to perform would make
available to the latter state all the sanctions of state responsibility
in international law." In the system of the Convention, therefore,
a new international obligation is superimposed on the earlier in-
ternal obligation, and the sanctions of the former in international
law are substituted for the sanctions of the latter in the internal
legal order of the state of the forum, or any third state where ex-
ecution of the judgment would be sought. In opting for this solu-
tion, the states members of the Council of Europe gave credence
to the expectation that a state would never be in the position of
a recalcitrant judgment debtor. 0
The Convention does not, however, make the private litigant
totally dependent on the state of his nationality for obtaining
satisfaction of a judgment rendered in his favor. The judgment-
creditor is not cast in the role of a helpless spectator of
76. Convention Explanatory Report, supra note 2, para. 5, at 6-7.
77. Convention, supra note 8, art. 20, para. 1.
78. See Convention, supra note 8, art. 20.
79. See Convention, supra note 8, art. 21, para. 1; Convention Explanatory
Report, supra note 2, para. 84, at 30-31.
80. See Convention Explanatory Report, supra note 2, para. 5, at 7.
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whatever action may or may not take place at the state-to-state
level between his state and the judgment-debtor state. The Con-
vention and the Additional Protocol entitle the judgment
creditor to have a judicial determination of the question about
whether effect should be given to the judgment or whether
there are valid reasons for refusal to do so under one of the ex-
ceptions set forth in the Convention.8' The judgment creditor
may bring the matter either before a court of the state against
which the judgment has been handed down or before the special
European Tribunal established under the Additional Protocol.82
This Tribunal consists of members of the European Court of
Human Rights and is presided over by the President of the
court."
Important as these safeguards are, the Convention still
perpetuates absolute immunity from execution; under it there
can be no forcible execution of a judgment against a foreign
state. The practice with regard to execution of some of the
states members of the Council of Europe has varied from that
described above. Those states who remain noncontracting will
most probably continue their current practices. Among those
states who are parties to the Convention, however, there is suffi-
cient community of attitudes to give rise to the expectation that
the states will voluntarily satisfy judgments."5
The U.S. Act, after reaffirming the principle of immunity from
execution, 8 lists a number of exceptions where execution can be
81. See Convention, supra note 8, art. 21: Additional Protocol to the Euro-
pean Convention on State Immunity, art. 1 (1972), reprinted in Convention Ex-
planatory Report, supra note 2, at 67-72 [hereinafter cited as Additional Pro-
tocol].
82. See Additional Protocol, supra .note 77, arts. 4-8.
83. Id. art. 4, para. 2.
84. See Convention, supra note 7A, art. 23.
85. A system comparable to that of the European Convention is to be
found in the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (1965) of the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. See INTERNA-
TIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, CONVENTION ON THE
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF
OTHER STATES (1970). Under Article 54, contracting states recognize the awards
of the Arbitral Tribunal established by the Convention as binding and under-
take to enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by such awards. Article 55
adds that there is no derogation from the law in force in any contracting state
relating to immunity of that state or any foreign state from execution.
86. See 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (1976).
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levied against the property of a foreign state. 7 Thus, the judg-
ment creditor can obtain forcible execution, apart from the case
of waiver, if any of the following conditions is met:
(1) The property of the foreign state is or was used for the
commercial activity upon which the claim is based.8 If the judg-
ment is against an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state
and not against the state itself, the scope of the property against
which execution can be levied is widened to include any property
of the agency or instrumentality "regardless of whether the prop-
erty is or was used for the activity upon which the claim is based.89
(2) The execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in
property which has been taken in violation of international law
or which has been exchanged for such property."
(3) The execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in
immovable property or in property acquired by succession or
gift. Diplomatic and consular property is explicitly excluded. 1
(4) The property consists of what an insurer owes the foreign
state or its employee under a policy of automobile or other
liability or casualty insurance.
The U.S. Act explicitly rules out the possibility of execution
against the property of a foreign central bank or monetary
authority "held for its own account."" It may on balance be-said
that under the U.S. Act there is quite a considerable area of
possible forcible execution against the property of a foreign
state.
The U.K. Act and the Singapore Act affirm the principle of
the foreign state's immunity from execution. 4 Both Acts,
however, provide that execution is possible in respect of prop-
erty which is for the time being in use or intended for use for
commercial purposes. 5 There is no distinction made here be-
87. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (1976). For a detailed study of the provisions of
the U.S. Act on immunity from execution, see Del Bianco, supra note 7.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (1976).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(2) (1976).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(3) (1976). This obviously assumes the presence of the
property in the United States.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(4)(B) (1976).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(5) (1976).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1611 (1976).
94. See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 13(2)(b); State Immunity Act,
1979, ch. 19, § 15(2(b) (Singapore).
95. See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 13(4); State Immunity Act,
1979, ch. 19, § 15(4) (Singapore).
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tween property used for the commercial activity upon which the
claim is based and any other commercial property of the foreign
state." There is also no difference between the foreign state as
such and its agencies or instrumentalities. 7 In this regard, the
provisions of the U.K. Act and the Singapore Act appear broader
than the corresponding provisions of the U.S. Act.
Both Acts also protect the property of a foreign state's central
bank or other monetary authority from execution by providing
that it shall not be regarded as in use or intended for use for
commercial purposes. 8 The foreign state is provided with at
least preliminary control over the characterization of any par-
ticular property as commercial or noncommercial.9 The Acts pro-
vide that the head of the diplomatic mission's certificate "to the
effect that any property is not in use or intended for use ... for
commercial purposes shall be accepted as sufficient evidence of
that fact unless the contrary is proved."'0' The burden of proof is
therefore on the judgment creditor seeking execution.
This brief review of the provisions of the U.K. Act and the
Singapore Act demonstrates that there is, more so than under
the U.S. Act, a considerable area of nonimmunity from execution,
although this area is less extensive than the area of nonimmunity
from suit.
IV. EFFECTS OF RECIPROCAL TREATMENT
Reciprocity is an integral part of the mechanism by which
rules of international law are created. In a world order still lack-
ing a central lawmaking authority, states are both the makers
and the subjects of international law. In a sense, reciprocal treat-
ment is one facet of the basic principle of the equality of states.
Every state wants to be treated no worse than it treats others
and can expect no better treatment than what it affords them.
96. See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 13(4); State Immunity Act,
1979, ch. 19, § 15(4) (Singapore).
97. See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 13(4); State Immunity Act,
1979, ch. 19, § 15(4) (Singapore).
98. See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 14(4); State Immunity Act,
1979, ch. 19, § 16(4) (Singapore).
99. See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 13(5); State Immunity Act,
1979, ch. 19, § 15(5) (Singapore).
100. See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 13(5); State Immunity Act,
1979, ch. 19, § 15(5) (Singapore).
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In the creation of rules of international law by treaty,
reciprocity is often explicitly invoked or is evident in the balance
of rights and obligations assumed by the parties. Reciprocity also
plays a major role in the creation of customary rules, as evidenced
in particular by the historical development of diplomatic law
before the Vienna Convention of 1961, ' ' which itself makes con-
siderable use of the concept of reciprocity. 2 The role of
reciprocity in the creation of customary rules can be explained
by the fact that such rules are not handed down by a higher
authority but are born out of the conduct of states which are
jealous of their equality before international law and are unlikely
to grant what they do not receive. Because the subjects of
customary rules are also their creators, reciprocity is necessarily
an important component of the mechanism by which those rules
are created. It has been rightly observed that "given the present
structure of the international community, reciprocity is at the
origin of all international law."' '
The rules regarding state immunity have developed principally
from the judicial practice of states, each acting within its own
jurisdiction. Municipal courts have been primarily responsible for
the growth and progressive development of a body of customary
rules governing the relations of nations in this particular connec-
tion.' 4 In this context, the operation of the principle of reciprocity
makes it inevitable that the restrictive approch to state immuni-
ty will gain ground as it has and that the least admitting of im-
munity among the rules applied by municipal courts will in time
acquire universality through the ripple effect of reciprocal treat-
ment. It is practically certain that states which are denied im-
munity in foreign courts will in turn deny it to foreign states in
their own courts in similar cases.
It has been observed, for example, that the United Kingdom
was precipitated into promulgating the State Immunity Act of
1978 by the realization that "the more restrictive immunity ac-
corded in most other states resulted in the embarrassing position
101. The Vienna Convention of 1961 of Diplomatic Relations. See generally
Cahier, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 57 INT'L CONCILIATION 5
(1969).
102. See Cahier, supra note 101, at 9 & 36.
103. Virally, 122 Recueil des cours de l'Academie de droit int'l 51 (1967).
104. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly
35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 321 para. 115, 330 para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/35/10.
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that the United Kingdom was unable to assert immunity when
sued in foreign courts whereas other states sued in United
Kingdom courts could assert immunity on similar facts.""1 5
Certain national statutes have explicitly incorporated the prin-
ciple of reciprocity in their regulation of state immunity. ' 6 There
can therefore be no possible disagreement with the statement
that reciprocity "has to be recognized as a legal principle ap-
plicable to the doctrine of sovereign immunity."'' 7
Because reciprocity is such a determining factor, the preval-
ence of a severely restricted and practically inexistent immunity
from suit in the four instruments under consideration insures
that this position will in time become universally accepted and
applied through the mere operation of the principle of reciprocity.
The major inroads which these instruments have made into im-
munity from execution are also bound to become universal. In
fact, many countries had already been restricting immunity from
execution long before the instruments under consideration caught
up with that practice. This process is now bound to snowball,
feeding on itself through the action of reciprocal treatment.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This survey of the provisions of the Convention and the three
Acts focused on the various possible sources of private rights
and obligations for a foreign state. The results show that in all
categories the areas reserved for immunity are either nonexis-
tent or, with regard to one source of obligations under the Con-
vention only, very restrictively defined. Under all four instru-
ments there is no immunity for the foreign state with regard to
its contractual obligations, by far the most important and the
most frequent source of claims leading to transnational disputes.
With regard to torts attributable to a foreign state which can
properly be brought before the local courts, there is also no im-
munity under the three Acts. There is a very limited immunity
under the Convention, available only to a foreign state having no
105. Marston, supra note 7, at 349.
106. See e.g., [1977] C. Anales, art. 24 (Argentina); Chilean Decree-Law No.
2349 of October 13, 1978, art. 9; Hungarian Decree-Law No. 13 of 1979 on
Private International Law, § 17, para. 2; Fundamentals of Civil Procedure in the
Soviet Union and the Union Republics, art. 61, para. 3.
107. 27 Zao RV at 692 (1967) (statement of Suy).
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office, agency, or other establishment in the state of the forum,
with regard only to torts resulting in purely nonmaterial injury.
The practical incidence of this immunity is likely to be minimal
Significantly, the U.K. Act, intended to implement the Conven-
tion of which the United Kingdom is a signatory, did not follow
the Convention on this point. It submits to the jurisdiction of
British courts all torts attributed to foreign states where there
is a nexus between the act or omission and the United Kingdom.
It will be interesting to see what other implementing national
statutes will do in this regard. If they follow the example of the
United Kingdom, and because of reciprocity they are likely to do
so, it can be unqualifiedly asserted that there are no longer any
concrete instances of immunity from tort liability in the current
regulation of the matter as reflected in the four most recent in-
struments, including the European Convention as put into effect
by implementing national legislation.
In respect of its obligations arising from ownership or posses-
sion of immovable property and its obligation derived directly
from the law, the foreign state has no immunity from suit under
all four instruments, outside the area of diplomatic immunities
with which this analysis is not concerned.
The inevitable conclusion is that, for all practical purposes,
assimilation of the position of the state before foreign courts to its
position before its own courts is now a fact of law, despite con-
tinued affirmation by all four instruments of the principle of im-
munity. States of all ideological persuasions have linked immunity
to sovereignty for so long that the issue has become for them
one charged with emotion. They cannot easily bring themselves
to face the withering away of state immunity. It appears that the
very process of negating immunity is helped by continuing to
pay lip service to the principle of immunity, as the four most re-
cent instruments on the subject expressly affirm the doctrine in
the face of compelling evidence to the contrary. A qualitative
mutation is represented as a mere quantitative change. The ne-
gation of the principle of state immunity is disguised as a mere
statement of exceptions to an ostensibly reaffirmed general rule
of immunity. The above assessment is supported by two further
considerations: First, public arts of a foreign state, the effects of
which are necessarily limited to its own territory, lie ab initio
beyond the jurisdiction of the local courts and do not, therefore,
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raise a proper issue of immunity; and, second, private acts of
foreign states are to be defined objectively, with reference to the
nature of the act, and not subjectively, with reference to the pur-
pose of the act, rendering impossible a claim to immunity in pro-
ceedings relating to a private act of the foreign state.'8
Between the first area of nonjurisdiction for the local courts and
the second vastly expanded area of no immunity for the foreign
state, there is not much room left for claiming or for granting
immunity from suit. A state does not fare better before a foreign
court that it does before its own courts. The virtual abolition of
the immunity from suit of foreign states appears to have become
a fact, awaiting only to be proclaimed.
In view of the existence of a more basic rule of international jur-
isdiction precluding local courts from even considering the public
acts of a foreign state, continued reliance on state immunity from
suit is nothing but a legal fiction deserving of Bentham's admoni-
tion: "What you have been doing by the fiction-could you or
could you not, have done it without the fiction? If not, your fic-
tion is a wicked lie; if yes, a foolish one. Such is the dilemma.
Lawyer! escape from it if you can."'0 9
In any transnational dispute, whether involving a foreign state
or not, the local court's first concern in limine litis is to justify
its assumption of jurisdiction based on a close connection be-
tween the forum and the facts of the case. Such a connection is
lacking when it comes to the public acts of foreign states done
per definitionem within their own territories in the exercise of
their governmental functions. Thus, the courts are simply pre-
108. See supra note 39. To the provisions of the four instruments which may
be cited in support of this point, the following quotation from the section-by-
section analysis accompanying the U.S. Act may be added:
As the definition indicates, the fact that goods or services to be pro-
cured through a contract are to be used for a public purpose is irrelevant;
it is the essentially commercial nature of an activity or transaction that is
critical. Thus, a contract by a foreign government to buy provisions or
equipment for its armed forces or to construct a government building con-
stitutes a commercial activity. The same would be true of a contract to
make repairs on an embassy building. Such contracts should be considered
to be commercial contracts, even if their ultimate object is to further a
public function.
H.R. REP., supra note 15, at 16.
109. C.K. OGDEN, BENTHAM'S THEORY OF FICTIONS at 141 (1932).
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eluded from taking cognizanace of any challenge to public acts of
foreign states and there is no need to invoke state immunity.
The defense of state immunity appears as a meta-juridical argu-
ment not pertaining to the self-contained and self-sufficient mech-
anism of positive law. Where the mechanism is capable of pro-
ducing the desired result, that is, protecting the public acts of
the state from foreign judicial interference, there is no reason
why its workings should be obscured behind the smokescreen of
immunity from suit.
As to transnational relationships into which states might enter
with private parties, they are of the same nature as similar rela-
tionships involving only private parties. At the national level,
the state is subject to the jurisdiction of its own courts in re-
spect of such relationships. There is no reason why the state
should not be subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign court when
that foreign court is empowered to take cognizance of a transna-
tional dispute under the rules of international jurisdiction. This
is not merely a logical inference from the analysis presented
herein. It is the reflection of the current state of the law as man-
ifested in the recent developments surveyed above, which, as ex-
plained, are destined to gain universality in the not-too-distant
future. Immunity from execution shows more durability because
of the somewhat different factors involved in execution against a
foreign state and, ultimately, because of the expectation that a
state will not in bad faith fail to satisfy a final and executory
judgment rendered in a matter in which it can claim no immun-
ity from suit. The relative durability of immunity from execu-
tion, as compared to the erosion of immunity from suit, is re-
flected in the unequal treatment of the matter by the four recent
instruments, which contrasts with their common negative ap-
proach to immunity from suit.
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